2017 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

4-19-2017

Steven Whelan v. Tandra Dawson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017

Recommended Citation
"Steven Whelan v. Tandra Dawson" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 377.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/377

This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-3084
___________
STEVEN WARREN WHELAN,
Appellant
v.
TANDRA L. DAWSON,
in her personal capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No 3-16-cv-02948)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 3, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

On May 24, 2016, pro se appellant Steven Warren Whelan filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging an order entered in
his divorce proceedings. Specifically, Whelan alleged that, on April 1, 2016, the
Honorable Tandra L. Dawson, who is presiding over his divorce proceedings in New
York Family Court, violated his constitutional rights by suspending a visitation order that
permitted him to see his young daughter. Whelan named Judge Dawson as the defendant
in his federal action, and, by way of relief, asked the District Court to allow him “routine
visits” with his daughter. Whelan also submitted a motion seeking the same relief in
conjunction with the complaint.
On June 28, 2016, following oral argument, the District Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied Whelan’s motion. Whelan
promptly filed an “emergency motion” for reconsideration, but, by order entered July 7,
2016, the District Court denied relief. Whelan timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over questions of subject matter jurisdiction.
Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 2009).
Upon review, we agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction over this
action. First, although it is not entirely clear from Whelan’s submissions whether the
state-court order suspending his visitation rights was final, if it was, then the District
Court was precluded from reviewing it under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over
actions in which the plaintiff is “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments”). Furthermore, to the extent that Whelan’s
complaint can be construed as invoking the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain
injunctive relief against Judge Dawson, the statute itself explicitly bars such relief. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”);
see also Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing “the impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an adjudicator rather
than an enforcer or administrator of a statute.”).
Accordingly, we will affirm.
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